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How much is electromagnetic spectrum worth? Appropriate metrics and methodologies for valuing 
spectrum help policymakers, network operators, service providers, and end-users in planning 
wireless-related investment and in ensuring that spectrum resources are used efficiently. 
Secondary markets have often served to provide publicly observable, market-based valuation 
metrics, but in the case of spectrum, these are under-developed and segmented, limiting the 
availability and comparability of market transactions as indicators of spectrum value. Furthermore, 
the continued growth in wireless services and networks of all types and further advances in 
wireless technologies enabling more dynamic and granular spectrum sharing are transforming the 
supply and demand conditions for RF spectrum. 
 
Today, the most common metric for valuing spectrum resources is $/MHz-POP, derived from 
dividing the value of a spectrum transaction by the total population in the coverage area of the 
license times the bandwidth (in MHz). Traditionally, spectrum value has been observed in 
spectrum auctions, M&A transactions involving the transfer of spectrum usage rights, or from 
infrequent secondary market activity. This was a viable approach when the fungibility of spectrum 
resources was limited by technical, market, and regulatory factors that constrained the 
commodification of highly differentiated spectrum resources and limited the potential for 
dynamically reallocating, substituting and transferring spectrum rights via markets.  
 
With increased opportunities for spectrum sharing, the transition to 5G, smaller cell architectures, 
and the emergence of IoT, new spectrum usage patterns are arising and enabling more granular, 
multi-dimensional, virtualized spectrum management (in terms of frequency, location, time, etc.). 
In a world of increasing spectrum sharing, dynamic spectrum access, and commercial applications 
of higher frequencies for wireless service, $/MHz-POP may be an increasingly noisy indicator of 
spectrum value.  
 
In this paper, we consider how changing technology, markets and policy are enabling the 
commoditization of spectrum resources and explore what that implies for traditional spectrum 
value metrics that are used to project auction proceeds and value spectrum transactions.  
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1. Introduction 
How much is electromagnetic spectrum worth? Today’s wireless environment is defined by the 
transition to 5G, the emergence of IoT, and rapidly increasing demand for data. These new trends 
are impacting how we use, access and define rights over spectrum. It is unclear to what extent 
current and legacy spectrum valuation methods and metrics still apply. Spectrum sharing, dynamic 
spectrum access, smaller cell architectures, and commercial applications of higher frequencies for 
wireless service may also be making the most commonly cited metric for spectrum value, $/MHz-
POP, an increasingly noisy indicator of spectrum value. Many of the traditional drivers of spectrum 
value may be less relevant in light of new technologies, while new factors are emerging as we push 
the frontiers of spectrum access. Even factors that remain relevant may have new implications. 
Consequently, fundamental changes in wireless services and networks suggest a need to reconsider 
the relevance of $/MHz-POP as a spectrum valuation metric.  
 
Current trends indicate that the future is shared spectrum, which poses challenges to spectrum 
valuation.  As a thought experiment, let us consider the value of a Priority Access License (PAL) 
in the emergent Citizens Band Radio Service (CBRS).3 Here, licenses are time limited and are only 
valid when the incumbent is not present. The measure of $/MHz-POP must be discounted by some 
factor in order to account for the incumbent’s use, which is unknown and potentially unknowable 
for national security reasons. Alternatively, with the movement to small cells that may make use 
of millimeter wave spectrum in the 5G future, a measure of MHz will be increasingly inappropriate 
for accounting for the much larger bandwidths that will be associated with millimeter wave 
licenses.  
 
Our objective in this paper is to consider the different aspects that enter (or should enter) in the 
spectrum value equation given recent trends in spectrum sharing and the development of secondary 
spectrum markets. To this end, we begin by exploring various factors that affect spectrum value 
and the valuation methods that are currently used. This allows us to set the stage for taking a more 
predictive approach towards defining spectrum value in more technically advanced settings, the 
economic implications these entail and the regulatory changes these may require. In this manner, 
we expect that this work will permit us to shed light on how economic measures should adapt to 
the continuous evolution of the technology that dictates novel spectrum-based services. 
 
The balance of this paper is organized into four sections. In Section 2, we review the challenges 
for valuing spectrum resources, identifying why metrics for valuation are important, the factors 
that impact spectrum valuation, and the earlier literature and methods used to value spectrum. In 
Section 3, we discuss several key trends in the wireless technology and markets that are rendering 
the valuation challenge more complex and moving us toward a potential future world in which 
Spectrum-as-a-Service may be more appropriate. In Section 4, we discuss the role of secondary 
spectrum markets in enabling such a world and highlight some of the policy options that could 
facilitate the emergence and maturation of such markets. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
                                               
3 The CBRS is being defined in the 3.5Ghz band (see https://www.fcc.gov/wireless/bureau-
divisions/broadband-division/35-ghz-band/35-ghz-band-citizens-broadband-radio). 
Page 4 of 28 
2. Spectrum Value 
Radio frequency spectrum derives its value from how it is used. Spectrum is an input in the means 
of production, and its value is derived from the value of the products and services that are produced 
by using the spectrum. Spectrum is a national resource that is managed by the government on 
behalf of the public interest. It is a renewable resource in that the quantity of spectrum is constant, 
although the capacity of the spectrum (the range and number of potential uses and users that the 
spectrum can sustain) has been increasing with the evolving state of wireless technologies, 
markets, and regulatory policies. The challenge of spectrum management is to maximize the total 
usage-value realized from our spectrum resources over time.  
 
In a world where all spectrum use is centrally administered (the ideal of Command and Control 
(C&C)),4 an ideal administrator would assign spectrum usage rights so as to realize the highest 
social (total) value over time. In an uncertain, changing world with imperfect and asymmetric 
information and multiple stakeholders pursuing their conflicting private interests, achieving this 
idealized goal of perfect C&C administration is impossible.  
 
Consequently, the actual management of spectrum has been decentralized and delegated to 
separate regulatory authorities and management regimes that have evolved over time. In the U.S., 
responsibility for managing spectrum resources is divided between the FCC (for commercial use 
spectrum) and the NTIA (for federal government use spectrum). In the case of the FCC, there has 
been an on-going decades-long trend toward transitioning away from C&C style management 
frameworks (in which government administrators play a more direct role in determining how 
spectrum is used) toward market-based management frameworks.5 More recently, policymakers 
have looked toward options for similarly transitioning government-use spectrum toward more 
market-responsive management.6  
 
Prices play a key role in markets, signaling the value or opportunity cost of resources to market 
participants, allowing them to make better informed decisions about resource use. Better market 
information on the price or market value of spectrum contributes to increased market efficiency 
and can help ensure that spectrum resources are directed to their highest-value uses over time. In 
an idealized world, spectrum might trade on the basis of efficient market pricing as a commodity 
via liquid, low-transaction-cost, competitive secondary markets. This would be the extreme 
counterpoint to the idealized C&C administrator model hypothesized earlier. Like the idealized 
                                               
4 The Command & Control (C&C) terminology was used as short-hand to characterize the administrative 
management of spectrum usage, isolated from market forces (see FCC (2002)). The C&C characterization 
applies perhaps best to Federal spectrum usage since even when spectrum rights were administratively 
assigned to commercial users (e.g., broadcast licenses in the past), those commercial users and their 
spectrum usage were still subject to market forces. Analogously, one may argue that even Federal users are 
not immune from market forces and so it is not appropriate to view spectrum management as a dichotomous 
choice between administrative government control versus market-based control, but rather as a continuum 
of spectrum management choices wherein government regulations continue to play a part in all regime 
frameworks, but with a changing role. 
5 See FCC (2002) or Robyn (2014). 
6 See PCAST (2012). 
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C&C model, however, a world in which spectrum traded like a homogeneous commodity is also 
impossible.  
 
Although this idealized market outcome is not feasible, the confluence of evolving technical, 
market, and policy forces offer the potential to make spectrum resources more commodity-like, 
which has the potential to enhance spectrum allocative, productive, and dynamic efficiency. The 
emergence of more liquid, lower transaction-cost, and competitive secondary markets for spectrum 
resources would be key enablers and outcomes of spectrum resources becoming commodified. The 
emergence of secondary markets is itself an outcome of an important complementary enabling 
development – the increased reliance on dynamic sharing of spectrum, wherein spectrum is shared 
not just among users of a single network (as occurs within cellular and WiFi networking already) 
but across users, uses, and networks (as may occur when non-affiliated users transfer differentiated 
bundles of usage rights via mature secondary markets). 
 
The efficiency of spectrum management depends on the ability to reallocate spectrum resources to 
higher value users, uses, and (lower-cost) technologies as market and technical conditions change. 
Administrative or market-based spectrum assignments that do not change over time, even if 
efficient at the original time of assignment, are unlikely to remain socially optimal over time. In a 
world in which spectrum usage or assignments cannot change and opportunities to substitute across 
rights bundles are limited, the benefits and need for consistent spectrum valuation metrics is much 
less. It is only with increased opportunities to change or transfer bundles of usage rights among 
stakeholders on a more granular and dynamic basis that the need for consistent pricing or spectrum 
valuation metrics becomes more important, as we will explain further below.   
 
In the balance of this section, we explain some of the reasons why spectrum is not easily 
commodified and hence, why seeking a single commodity price or value metric that is applicable 
across very different bundles of usage rights is difficult if not infeasible. Although spectrum rights 
are becoming increasingly substitutable as a consequence of technical and market supply and 
demand trends and regulatory reforms, it is important to understand why spectrum usage rights 
will remain, at best, imperfect substitutes. We conclude the discussion with a review of prior efforts 
to estimate the dollar value of spectrum. 
2.1. Factors differentiating spectrum resources 
In the following sub-sections, we review key reasons why different bundles of spectrum access 
rights are valued differently and will remain, at best, imperfect substitutes. 
2.1.1. Physics 
The physics of radio-frequency propagation provides the first factor that explains why spectrum 
resources are imperfect substitutes. Electromagnetic spectrum is a multidimensional resource. 
Matheson and Morris (2012) characterize spectrum as a seven-dimensional electrospace.7 The 
                                               
7 The capacity of spectrum is interference limited and interference occurs at the receiver when it is incapable 
of disambiguating its intended signal from the noise of other transmissions in the spectrum. Conceptually, 
a perfect receiver could separate signals that differed along any of seven possible dimensions: frequency, 
time, spatial location (x-y-z location), or direction of travel (azimuth, elevation angle). The existing state 
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physics of electromagnetic propagation make certain "regions" of electrospace more desirable for 
particular economically valuable applications: different frequency bands offer different 
coverage/capacity tradeoffs, options for antenna design (e.g., size, directionality), network 
architecture choices (e.g., cell size), etcetera. For example, lower frequency bands have better non-
line-of-sight (NLOS) propagation characteristics, which make them better at penetrating buildings 
and less susceptible to attenuation from natural factors. This makes lower frequency spectrum 
attractive for providing ubiquitous coverage, although at the expense of antenna size and capacity.8 
Hence, historically, lower frequency bands have been preferred for commercial services as these 
allow coverage to be maximized with relatively fewer access points (or base stations).9  
 
As demand increases in denser population, higher use areas, higher frequencies have become more 
valuable assets, as these can more easily provide the additional capacity needed by existing service 
providers. Propagation losses at higher frequencies are often offset by the use of directional 
antennas, which, also allow for greater spatial sharing. These opportunities have prompted a shift 
towards millimeter wave spectrum and small cells.10 Nevertheless, there are still physical 
limitations to consider. For instance, the limited coverage area of these spectrum bands and their 
high susceptibility to obstacles and interference, make these bands useful for enhancing localized 
access opportunities instead of maximizing coverage.11  
2.1.2. Technology state of the art 
The state of the art and commercial availability at scale of new wireless technologies is another 
important factor that impacts the value of different bundles of spectrum usage rights. Although the 
physics of spectrum propagation do not change, new technology makes it feasible to support 
valuable uses across a wider range of spectrum bands, thereby rendering different frequency 
spectrum closer (if still imperfect) substitutes in many networking contexts. For example, cellular 
services operate globally on a wide range of frequency bands, and most cell phones are capable of 
some degree of frequency agility that allows mobile services to roam across frequencies and 
provider networks.  
 
Historically, radio hardware and types of services were closely coupled because of limited link 
budgets and the need to more tightly customize the value chain to make it work. This was 
especially challenging in early analog systems. With the rise of MIMO, cognitive radio and SDR 
                                               
of wireless technology and networking limits the capabilities of receivers to separate signals, thereby 
limiting the realizable capacity of spectrum. For further discussion, see Matheson and Morris (2012). 
8 Lower frequency antennas are larger and there is less frequency available for a given bandwidth, so band 
allocations are smaller for lower frequency spectrum.  
9 Additionally, digital processing of wireless signals is easier with lower frequency spectrum because lower 
sampling rates are required to digitize the signals. As digital processors have become faster and less 
expensive, higher frequency spectrum has become easier to use. 
10 Small cells are low power (20 to 100mW), limited range (no more than 100m) wireless base station[s] or 
Access Point[s] ("AP") offering variable data rates (from 10-100Mbps or higher). For further discussion, 
see Lehr & Oliver (2014). 
11 From a broader coverage perspective, significant investments would be required to match spectrum 
access opportunities provided by lower bands. 
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capabilities, digital signal processing and a host of other technologies, it has become easier to 
manage and implement applications in multiple frequency bands. In turn, the rise of spread 
spectrum technologies, improved antenna designs, among others, allowed for more fine-grained, 
multidimensional receiver designs. 
 
Technology now exists to unbundle applications from frequencies (e.g., network and resource 
virtualization), to aggregate frequencies and potentially manage waveforms on a case-by-case 
basis (in real time with communicating cognitive radios, supplemented by control channels). For 
example, current LTE standards support dynamic channel selection, channel aggregation, 
cooperative networks, multi-radio hand-sets, and other capabilities that allow heterogeneous 
spectrum resources to be used to support applications.  
 
As technology reduces the advantages of operating in particular frequency bands by providing 
work-arounds to physical differences, it has expanded the range of usable frequencies (reducing 
spectrum scarcity by expanding the extrinsic margin) and increased the substitutability of adjacent 
frequencies. This is reflected in the availability of hardware, and increasingly software, that makes 
radios and their services more frequency agile.  
2.1.3. Policy and Regulatory Legacies 
The value of spectrum usage rights depends, in part, on the license arrangements, as these constrain 
the services to be provided and the business models to be employed. This limits spectrum 
substitutability and the potential to allow markets to reallocate spectrum usage toward higher-value 
uses.  
 
While technological advances may have increased spectrum substitutability, the potential to 
substitute or reallocate spectrum resources has been limited by the regulatory framework. 
Historically, C&C regulation narrowly dictated the applications and technologies that could be 
employed in the use of different spectrum resources.12. For example, broadcast spectrum was 
reserved for use by high-power, television broadcasting stations until relatively recently, 
precluding the use of such spectrum for mobile broadband applications. With the transition to the 
allocation of exclusive-licensed, flexible-use spectrum for mobile telephony and the introduction 
of unlicensed (commons) usage models, significant progress has been made toward enabling 
market-based spectrum resource assignment.13 More generally, the nature of the regulatory 
                                               
12 This is typically referred to as spectrum allocation.  Market-based methods are generally applied to the 
problem of spectrum assignment, which involves the determination of which user gets which rights in a 
particular time and location.  
13 In debates over spectrum management regimes, there have been disagreements over whether unlicensed 
spectrum allocations represent a market-based approach, or whether the only true market-based approach 
is based on (exclusively) licensed spectrum. The debate hinged on whether unlicensed spectrum 
(characterized as a spectrum commons) should be viewed as a property rights regime in so far as the rights 
to use the spectrum were shared by all compliant users, the terms under which the sharing was regulated 
were set by government regulations (Part 15 rules), and the spectrum was not amenable to market-based 
trading of the rights. This was in contrast to licensed spectrum which was often accompanied with a property 
right allowing licensees to exclude other users, and in some cases allowing the licensee to sell the license 
via a secondary market transaction, thereby giving the licenses an aspect of private property with its 
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framework governing different spectrum bands, wireless uses and usage models has had a 
significant impact on the value of spectrum resources and their potential to be imperfect 
substitutes. 
 
Increasing flexible spectrum access opportunities has been the driving force for regulatory reforms 
for some time. These efforts confirm the readiness to continue the shift from a C&C model to more 
market-oriented and resource sharing methods. This transition has been challenging and slowed 
by shifting technologies and the presence of incumbent systems. New resource use and sharing 
methods have necessitated rethinking the allocation of spectrum rights bundles along the 
continuum between the exclusive-use and commons extremes.14 These bundles of rights are also 
subject to legacy rights assignments to incumbents that remain associated with particular bands 
due to past regulatory decisions and investments. This adds to the complexity of the resulting 
bundles of rights, as we now face intricate rights systems (i.e., a ‘patchwork of legal rights’).  
2.1.4. Markets and Incumbency 
The growth of demand for spectrum resources, maturity of the market and diversity of participants 
varies greatly across wireless markets, which has a significant impact on spectrum valuation. For 
spectrum to be reallocated to a higher value use, incumbent users need to be relocated and the 
strategic interests of incumbent and new users need to be reconciled. The relevant challenges are 
band and context dependent. For example, over-the-air TV operates in the 600MHz band due to 
legacy technology and architecture that relies on high-power, large-cell broadcast networks that 
need to be cleared out of the spectrum before it can be used by mobile broadband networks. 
Alternatively, any consideration of repurposing unlicensed Wi-Fi spectrum would confront a 
tragedy of the anti-commons if attempted;15 and eliminating exclusivity on LTE licensed spectrum 
would confront resistance from incumbents who would be likely to resist the perceived 
expropriation of their usage rights.   
2.1.5. Other Factors  
In addition to the basic physics and the state of technology, regulations and markets, a number of 
other factors impact the value of spectrum resources. 
                                               
attendant economic implications (e.g., strong incentives to internalize the costs and benefits of using the 
resource efficiently). More recent analyses have recognized that both unlicensed and licensed are property 
rights regimes which are subject to different government regulations (so neither is purely market-based) 
that provide expanded scope for market competition to determine how spectrum resources are used (relative 
to prior regimes characterized as C&C). With licensed spectrum, the role for market forces is more direct 
and most saliently demonstrated in the competition among cellular network operators. With unlicensed 
spectrum, the market forces play out through competition among wireless equipment makers and through 
the usage decisions of unlicensed users which include both end-users and network operators, and as we 
discuss further below, increasingly cellular network operators. For a discussion of these debates, see for 
example, Hazlett (1998), Faulhaber and Farber (2002), or Lehr (2009). 
14 For a discussion of emergent rights relationships, see Weiss et al. (2015). For a discussion of how rights 
bundles may arise in spectrum sharing scenarios, Cui, Gomez & Weiss (2014). 
15 The Tragedy of the Anticommons arises when the rights to use a resource are too widely distributed or 
fragmented, resulting in a coordination breakdown if an attempt is made to move the resource to another 
rights model.  
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Whether spectrum is paired or harmonized are additional factors that can affect spectrum value. 
Because most mobile operators rely on paired spectrum (one channel for upstream and one for 
downstream transmissions), exclusive licenses for paired spectrum are valued higher than for 
unpaired spectrum. However, the growth in asymmetric traffic flows (primarily driven by the 
increased need to support video traffic flowing downstream to subscriber handsets) and expanded 
capabilities to support time-division multiplexing of wireless signals are reducing reliance on 
paired spectrum, and may be expected to limit the price premium associated with paired resources. 
 
Similarly, spectrum that is internationally harmonized is more valuable since it facilitates 
international roaming and supports a lower cost ecosystem, reducing deployment costs. Radio 
equipment providers are more inclined to provide equipment for harmonized spectrum because of 
the larger addressable market it implies.  
 
The emergence of software defined radio (SDR) and cognitive radio (CR) technologies have 
reduced the relative benefits of using harmonized or paired spectrum, since SDR/CR allow 
waveforms to be adjusted to accommodate differences in frequencies. Such technologies also make 
it easier to customize hardware/software and spectrum management on a more granular, dynamic 
basis (e.g., customization in time, location, frequency, etc.).  
 
Finally, it is important to remember that the geographic location where spectrum resources are to 
be used impacts the demand for service and the costs of deploying wireless infrastructure and 
network operations. The terrain, foliage, weather, and presence of potential spectrum users can 
impact spectrum and wireless networking requirements, and hence has a significant impact on 
spectrum value. Also, spectrum needs to be available where the demand for wireless 
communications is located. Thus, 10MHz of spectrum in New Mexico is valued differently than 
the same 10MHz of spectrum in Manhattan or Maine, and spectrum rights in New Mexico are not 
substitutes for spectrum rights in New York. When spectrum is able to be assigned on a more 
granular basis, this will contribute to the potential for increased variation in pricing for spectrum 
resources on a more granular basis. This may offset the forces of flexibility that might otherwise 
be driving spectrum values toward less differentiated pricing (valuation).  
2.1.6. Summing up 
The physics of RF propagation, legacy regulations, incumbent resistance, and other factors render 
spectrum imperfect substitutes; however the growth of market demand (increasing demand for 
capacity spectrum, relative to coverage spectrum), the development of more frequency-agile radio 
networks, and the transition to more market-friendly spectrum management frameworks has 
increased options for viewing spectrum in different bands as substitutes and the benefits from 
reallocating spectrum rights to higher value uses.  
 
This simultaneously increases the need for better spectrum valuation or "pricing" metrics and the 
complexity of the challenges associated with developing such metrics. If spectrum were fully 
commodifiable (i.e., capable of being rendered as perfect substitutes), then we might hope that 
market forces would assert the economic "law of one price," rendering objective spectrum 
valuation easier. Unfortunately, as discussed above, while technical and market trends have 
increased opportunities to substitute among spectrum resources (i.e., rendered spectrum more 
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commodity-like), this process remains far from complete today and spectrum resources will remain 
imperfect substitutes indefinitely.  
 
To evaluate the benefits, for welfare maximization and to individual stakeholders, of reallocating 
spectrum resources, spectrum markets need better spectrum pricing information with which to 
value spectrum resources. When spectrum is shared, the total value of the spectrum is the 
cumulative value to all uses.16 This fundamental principle—that spectrum value is derived from 
the benefits of services deployed—holds for all spectrum, regardless of service, whether the 
spectrum is licensed, licensed by rule, or unlicensed. 
 
For licensed spectrum, we can observe the prices at which licenses trade at auction, via secondary 
market leases, or via M&A transactions. The availability of such transaction data makes it easier 
to quantify the economic value of licensed spectrum. Estimating the value of unlicensed spectrum 
is more challenging since the value must be inferred from the value of the goods and services that 
make use of the unlicensed spectrum.17 Although unlicensed spectrum cannot be purchased (and 
hence there is no observed total transaction value), it is incorrect to infer that there is no private 
opportunity cost or price associated with its use by end-users or wireless network operators.18  
 
When we observe the price at which an exclusive-use spectrum license trades, we do not observe 
its total value to society, but rather the value to the acquiring licensee. It is the present value of 
future profits associated with specific rights to deploy on exclusive spectrum. Economists often 
think of this as the economic rents associated with a specific spectrum assignment.19 The total 
value of the spectrum to society may be estimated by adding the consumer surplus generated by 
the services provided by the licensee (which is the difference between the consumers' willingness 
to pay and what they actually pay for the services).20  
 
Furthermore, the value that a particular stakeholder may place on spectrum depends on that 
individual's perspective. One might be interested in the total value to society or the economy that 
may be derived from the use of spectrum. For example, Hazlett, Munoz, and Avanzini (2012) 
                                               
16 For a detailed discussion of the sources of spectrum value in the context of spectrum sharing see Bazelon 
and McHenry (2014). Also, see Forge, Horvitz & Blackman (2012). 
17 As an example of economic value added by unlicensed spectrum see Katz (2014). 
18 Operating in unlicensed spectrum exposes users to the risk of congestion from other users, which imposes 
a cost that may be viewed as stochastically variable spectrum capacity. While different in detail, that is not 
fundamentally different from the stochastically variable capacity that the holder of an exclusive spectrum 
license has when having to contend with dead spots due to leaves or buildings. In both cases, spectrum 
availability is uncertain and that uncertainty factors into the valuation equation that different users will use 
in valuing alternative portfolios of spectrum rights. 
19 For a detailed discussion of economic rents and the value of spectrum licenses see Bazelon and McHenry 
(2013). 
20 Nonetheless, since the total consumer welfare is greater than the potential economic activity, we consider 
it beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of the consumer welfare generated by licensed spectrum, 
see Bazelon and McHenry (2015). Additionally, there is also the social value of wireless services enabled 
by federal spectrum use. While the value of these services—and the spectrum that enables them—is 
undeniable, they are outside of the scope of this paper. 
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developed order of magnitude comparisons of U.S. wireless service revenues and the associated 
consumer surplus generated by the almost 200MHz allocated to cellular operators in 2009 ($301-
$364B) to the total auction proceeds from 1994-2009 ($53 billion), leading them to conclude that 
the value created by spectrum usage vastly exceeds the realized transaction value from spectrum 
auctions. This is hardly surprising but the focus of Hazlett et al. (2012) was not to value the 
spectrum directly, but to infer how the value generated by the spectrum is impacted by the 
mechanism used to allocate the spectrum.  
 
When looking across countries, Hazlett & Munoz (2009) conclude that auctions that focus on 
getting the spectrum into the hands of the most efficient operators (rather than those designed to 
capture spectrum rents as general government revenues or assign spectrum via beauty contests or 
lotteries) generate significantly more value for the economy, and hence are to be preferred. In a 
similar theme, Hazlett (2005) has argued that exclusive, flexible-use licensed spectrum, with its 
strong incentives for the licensees to use the spectrum efficiently, produces an order-of-magnitude 
higher total value for society than does spectrum allocated for unlicensed uses. However, the 
comparison is misleading because whereas the cellular industry revenues provide a monetary 
estimate of the value associated with using cellular spectrum, there is no comparable data available 
for unlicensed use. Countering Hazlett's argument, Thanki (2012) estimates that the combined 
economic value to the U.S. economy contributed by a subset of the applications associated with 
users of unlicensed spectrum is several times larger than Hazlett's estimates.21  
2.2. Estimating the value of commercial spectrum licenses 
In practice, observing the value of spectrum licenses is challenging for several reasons. The 
profitability of a spectrum license, as with most assets, is often not directly observable. Spectrum 
value estimates are generally based on existing market transactions. However, the paucity of 
market transactions and significant variability in the characteristics of individual specific spectrum 
licenses is not generally observable to practitioners.  
 
As with any asset, there are several potential ways to estimate value: (1) analyze transaction data 
to determine market values for different spectrum bundles; (2) develop a general equilibrium 
model of supply and demand to estimate a market equilibrium price for spectrum; (3) build a cost 
model to estimate net profits from the band; (4) infer value of spectrum indirectly from changes in 
value of another asset (e.g., market value of firm varying with event that is directly related to 
spectrum value); or (5) a hybrid approach of the above. With respect to spectrum; however, each 
of these approaches is complicated due to the lack of transactional data and the complexity of 
modeling costs or revenues from any given service. As the complexity of networks increases with 
5G, applying any of these approaches is likely to become even more challenging.  
 
Most valuations of spectrum allocated as flexible use licensed or intended for wireless broadband 
have relied on a normalized metric that converts transaction values for different bundles of 
                                               
21 Other examples of dueling estimates of the economic value created by the use of spectrum for licensed 
or unlicensed spectrum are provided by Cooper (2012); Deloitte (2014), Lewin, Marks and Nicoletti (2013); 
Milgrom, Levin & Eilat (2011); Thanki (2009), and Ofcom (2006).  
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spectrum rights into a normalized spectrum "price" metric (i.e., $/MHz-POP).22 The $/MHz-POP 
price metric is computed by dividing the total value of a spectrum transaction, in dollars, by a 
normalized quantity metric – the number of megahertz (MHz) included in the license times the 
population (POP) in the license coverage area.23  
 
The $/MHz-POP metric captures several of the key features that go into determining the private 
value of the spectrum rights that may be transferred via a spectrum transaction. The larger the 
frequency range, the larger the "quantity" of spectrum included in the transaction, which is a rough 
proxy for capacity. The larger the geographic area, the larger the potential market that the spectrum 
covers in geo-space. However, that tends to be less important in terms of sizing a market's revenue-
generating potential than the population included in the coverage area of the license territory.  
 
Among the benefits of this metric has been its comparability across spectrum transactions, 
frequency bands, geographic areas, time, and a host of other characteristics. With specific 
adjustments for the unique characteristics of a spectrum license, the $/MHz-POP value of any 
wireless broadband spectrum license could be estimated, compared to other bands, or converted to 
the total license value.  
 
Spectrum valuation approaches often leverage the $/MHz-POP metric in order to compare 
spectrum values across individual licenses and estimate the value of unique licenses. For example, 
suppose one knows the $/MHz-POP "price" of a spectrum transaction for a specific licensed area. 
By using historical auction results to estimate the relative spectrum value between the known 
license area and a target estimation area, one can estimate the implied market price of any other 
license within the same band. Likewise, by converting a transaction to the average $/MHz-price 
for an entire band, one can estimate the value of other bands based on the unique characteristics of 
the two bands. 
 
Researchers have also used this metric as the basis for econometric modeling, by converting the 
value of each license to $/MHz-POP. For example, Connolly et al. (2018) and Wallsten (2016) 
provide two recent studies that used data from the U.S. spectrum auctions since 1996 to 
econometrically estimate the value of licensed spectrum. The results are highly complementary 
with Wallsten (2016) using data for all 69,000 licenses that were auctioned in the 80 auctions that 
took place from 1996 through 2011. Connolly et al. (2018) focuses on a smaller subset of the 
licenses (about 7,000) that were awarded from 1996 through 2015 for use by mobile applications. 
In both cases, the economists provide hedonic econometric estimates showing how the license 
prices varied with a range of factors. The authors convert the transaction data to $/MHz-POP prices 
to normalize the observed transactional data on a common, comparable basis.  
 
Wallsten (2016) finds that licenses with more MHz are more valuable, but not on a $/MHz basis, 
which seems surprising and may be due to unobserved factors (e.g., lower frequency spectrum 
which is also typically associated with smaller MHz licenses earning a significant premium relative 
                                               
22 The $/MHz-POP metric is specific to mobile broadband licenses. Broadcast licenses, for example, are 
typically valued based on license or population.  
23 That is, if one views the value of the transaction as "P times Q" then to compute P you divide PQ by Q, 
where Q is the normalized quantity metric. 
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to higher frequency spectrum licenses). Both Wallsten (2016) and Connolly et al. (2018) find that 
licenses with higher POP are more valuable, which is logical since licenses covering more POP 
signal larger addressable market demand potential. Connolly et al. (2018) also find that value 
increases with median income and POP density, which further accentuates the demand potential. 
Both studies find that paired spectrum is more valuable than unpaired, which reflects the legacy 
bias of mobile network technologies to use separate channels for upstream and downstream traffic 
between the handsets and the cellular base stations. Wallsten (2016) also finds that policy 
uncertainty lowers license values, whereas increased flexibility increases license values. The fact 
that CMRS licenses, which are flexible, are more valuable is a point noted in the various papers 
by Hazlett cited earlier and is further emphasized in Connolly et al. (2018). Both studies find that 
spectrum value increased over time as markets for wireless services and applications expanded 
and demand soared. 
 
An interesting point noted by Connolly et al. (2018) is that the discount associated with higher 
frequency spectrum has decreased as a consequence of technological advances that make using 
such spectrum less costly24 and demand for additional, less-crowded spectrum has increased. 
Finally, Wallsten (2016) finds that license prices (measured as $/MHz-POP) are higher for smaller 
territory licenses, which challenged prior presumptions that larger area licenses are more valuable. 
Both of these results are encouraging for the 5G future because of the expected transition toward 
smaller cells and expanded use of higher-frequency spectrum.  
 
In addition to evaluating the transaction data provided by auctions, Wallsten (2016) also examines 
data on secondary market spectrum trading associated with mergers and acquisitions and spectrum 
deals reported in the trade press. Wallsten finds this data complements that auction data, but tends 
to be of lower quality. Unfortunately, the publicly reported data is not always sufficiently detailed 
to allow one to infer the full terms of the transaction. Additionally, many of the deals involve non-
spectrum assets as well, so isolating the spectrum values becomes problematic.  
 
Another approach to valuing spectrum is to focus on modeling the costs of using alternative 
spectrum resources. Many of these studies are based on engineering cost models of building 
wireless networks using particular cellular resources. Most of these studies do not directly address 
the question of how changing the spectrum resources would impact overall costs, but to the extent 
they enable such calculations they can contribute to estimating the opportunity cost (value) of 
different spectrum resources. Examples of studies that have estimated the costs of building 
wireless networks with different spectrum resources include Oughton and Frias (2017), who 
provide a detailed cost-model for building out 5G small cell infrastructure across the UK; Frias et 
al. (2017) who consider the total cost of ownership of different portfolios of spectrum assets; 
Johansson et al. (2007), who model the costs of supporting heterogeneous wireless networks; and 
Bouras et al. (2015), who model the costs of dense cell deployments. Gomez and Weiss (2013) 
offer one of the few papers to examine how different technical features may limit spectrum 
substitutability, thereby reducing the fungibility of different spectrum rights. 
 
                                               
24 For example, widespread commercialization of MIMO techniques and more intelligent antenna designs 
facilitates using higher-frequency spectrum.  
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Nonetheless, this metric cannot capture the variety of critical market factors that are just as 
important as the number of megahertz and the covered population. All of these factors make 
spectrum un-commodity or un-widget-like. In this way, the "MHz-POP" approach offers a very 
imperfect quality-adjusted way to account for the "quantity" or the bundle of spectrum associated 
with different spectrum transactions. Although these complicating factors have always been 
considered by participants engaged in spectrum transactions, the compelling need of business 
planners, policymakers, investors, market analysts, and academic researchers for a simple, 
comparable price metric has ensured that the price metric, $/MHz-POP, remains in common use. 
As the complicating factors, however, become more complex and difficult to account for in basic 
valuation strategies, the comparability and meaning of the metric becomes more strained. 
 
Perhaps more critically, however, recent market trends discussed further below suggest that 
comparability across bandwidths and populations is increasingly challenging. Spectrum sharing 
across frequencies and time, dynamic spectrum access and the focus on millimeter wave spectrum 
suggests that the MHz are no longer comparable across spectrum bands. Likewise, geographic and 
temporal spectrum sharing, combined with increased focus on small cells in high capacity areas 
makes even estimating the relevant population challenging. 
3. Market and Technical Trends Impacting How Spectrum is Valued 
In Section 2.1, we presented different factors that impact spectrum valuation and in section 2.2, 
reviewed existing methods for valuing spectrum resources, including methods that focused on 
transactional data associated with commercial-use licensed spectrum. In what follows, we explore 
market and technical trends that are shaping the current telecom environment, and how these are 
impacting the way in which spectrum may be valued, and contributing to the need for new 
valuation metrics. 
3.1. Spectrum Sharing is the only feasible future 
The future of spectrum use, at the extensive and intensive margin, will have to include sharing. 
The chimera of clean, exclusive use spectrum is increasingly elusive, as most spectrum resources 
become shared. Consequently, the dichotomy between exclusive-use and shared spectrum 
becomes more nuanced. These nuances are translated into different definitions of property rights, 
which are assembled into rights bundles that address the needs of different services and adapt to 
the requirements of incumbents and new entrants.  
 
Initial sharing schemes clearly defined priorities and rights (e.g., tiered-sharing schemes deployed 
for CMRS and TVWS); however, as more complex sharing and rights arrangements emerge 
(including those relying on smart-spectrum contracts enabled by technologies like blockchain (see 
Weiss et.al. (2018))), we may find even more diversified rights regimes with reduced priorities or 
obligations to share.  
 
As more factors affect the definition of rights, their value becomes more context-dependent. To be 
able to assess whether the value of A is greater than B, we would need to calculate the marginal 
values of A and B with respect to all the variables affecting the valuation of these assets. 
Consequently, the calculation of the value of the widely varying bundles of rights remains a 
challenge that needs to be addressed. 
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Along these lines, the underlying value of the resulting bundles of rights is continuously created 
through technologies that turn these bundles into marketable services and allow for the 
development of enforcement mechanisms that render these rights meaningful (see Weiss et al. 
(2012)), by ensuring quality of service, resource availability and access conditions for incumbents 
and service providers.  
 
In summary, more nuanced rights make a cost/benefit analysis more complex, hence posing 
challenges towards properly defining the value of specific resources. The underlying goal is to 
navigate through this "rights’ patchwork" and still be able to assemble resources that can satisfy 
different types of services. We expect technical approaches such as channel aggregation (provided 
by LTE) and resource/network virtualization to help in this process by reducing transaction and 
search costs.25 Additionally, technology should continue to evolve to make it possible to identify 
sharing opportunities (i.e., white spaces) and detect violations in more constrained and variable 
settings. 
 
The use of the $/MHz-POP metric for evaluating the value of licensed spectrum, and in particular, 
the value of exclusive/flexible use spectrum licenses for mobile broadband made sense in a world 
where most of the network providers were relying on licensed spectrum. The $/MHz-POP 
estimates from auctions or other secondary market transactions could be tweaked using factor 
adjustments (as suggested by Wallsten, 2016, or Bazelon and McHenry, 2014) to derive 
comparable estimates for potential private value of licenses for substitute rights bundles.  
 
Furthermore, from a policy perspective, the distinction between spectrum license economic value 
and total value to the spectrum user was less important. Policymakers expected total value to rise 
with spectrum license value, so as long as the allocations of licensed spectrum (principally via 
competitive auctions) were generally maximizing spectrum license value, then that would also 
result in the maximization of total value. 
 
Finally, earlier spectrum frequency allocations were more closely aligned with particular markets 
(by usage, technology, and business model), rendering transactions across heterogeneous 
frequency bands (rights bundles) either impossible or less likely (e.g, broadcast spectrum traded 
as broadcast licenses and PCS spectrum traded as cellular licenses). In this world, opportunities 
for substitutability or transactions involving the transfer of rights bundles across licensing 
frameworks (e.g., exclusive/flexible use licenses v. unlicensed), frequencies (mid-band or lower-
frequencies), and demand scenarios (broadcast or government-use spectrum being transferred via 
market transactions to mobile broadband use) were more limited. Consequently, stakeholders had 
less need for consistent pricing or valuation metrics to compare very different spectrum rights 
bundles.  
 
As wireless network operators expand the portfolio of services they seek to offer and increasingly 
make use of unlicensed or shared spectrum (with more limited exclusivity rights), $/MHz-POP 
estimates, derived from commercial license transaction data, offer a less reliable basis for valuing 
                                               
25 In section 3, we take a deeper look into different technical scenarios and how they affect spectrum 
valuation.  
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the economic and social value of spectrum. As spectrum users contemplate deploying services that 
will make use of a mix of complementary spectrum resources across diverse frequency bands 
(where the ability to substitute is more difficult and requires substantially greater complementary 
investments in non-spectrum infrastructure to accomplish) and regulatory regimes (e.g., mixing 
licensed and unlicensed), operators will need a valuation metric that accounts for the value added.  
 
Furthermore, with the emergence of new usage models (e.g., Internet of Things devices that may 
value coverage over capacity and may have more limited spectrum agility, or new types of 
specialized MVNOs or wireless operators that wish to rely on dynamically-available on-demand 
spectrum), valuation metrics that presume relatively long-lived licenses (which have been typical 
of mobile licensing) may be less applicable.  
 
This suggests that we need to clearly distinguish between two separate shortfalls of the $/MHz-
POP metric: (1) With spectrum sharing, DSA and millimeter wave, the $/MHz-POP is an 
increasingly imprecise unit of measure to estimate spectrum license value; and (2) as we continue 
to share more spectrum and rely more on unlicensed spectrum, policymakers need to be thinking 
about how to quantify this total value to ensure we continue to put spectrum to its highest and best 
use. 
3.2. Technologies Impacting Spectrum Value 
With the transition to 5G underway and 6G on the horizon, our expectations have significantly 
risen as to what these technologies will enable. Behind the scenes, there are a series of technical 
measures that need to be taken into account, which include the design and adoption of small-cell 
networks, the utilization of millimeter-wave spectrum, enhanced spectrum management 
capabilities, among others. Taken together, these emergent technologies are expanding the 
universe of spectrum usage rights bundles that need to be valued and simultaneously making it 
feasible to substitute more flexibly across rights bundles and opening up opportunities for more 
granular and differentiated pricing of different rights bundles. These conflicting trends are 
increasing the need for better valuation metrics at the same time that they are making acquiring 
such metrics more challenging. In the following sub-sections, we explore how these technical 
factors impact the valuation of spectrum.  
3.2.1. Millimeter-Wave Spectrum  
Meeting the need for the order-of-magnitude improvements in performance promised by 5G will 
require greatly expanding the capacity of existing mobile broadband networks. Part of this need is 
expected to come from exploiting frequency bands above 10GHz. These bands have particular 
physical characteristics, which may bring new factors into the valuation equation. First, because 
these bands have only recently begun to attract commercial interest, we can expect the value of 
these bands to increase in value as prospects for their usefulness in delivering valuable wireless 
services increases. Second, however, prospects for using millimeter wave (mmW) spectrum are 
constrained by the physical characteristics of these bands. For instance, their propagation 
characteristics make their coverage area rather small, which would require a larger investment in 
hardware to obtain the same coverage as lower frequencies. Although this increases infrastructure 
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costs for providing coverage, it also makes it possible to reuse spectrum more aggressively with a 
reduced risk for interference from adjacent cells.26  
 
If we take population density into account, higher frequency spectrum is less likely to be cost-
effectively deployed in low density areas. This suggests that the relative value of high frequency 
spectrum in rural areas, compared to urban areas, will be even lower.  
 
Another difference is that mmW spectrum is much less scarce and channels are expected to be 
allocated with larger bandwidths and across wider frequency ranges. This makes comparing them 
on a per-MHz basis less useful. 
 
Future spectrum valuation should reflect a more granular analysis of areas that will be deployed 
for specific frequencies. This may be achieved through a spectrum fungibility analysis where 
factors of concern are compared, such as coverage, capacity, etc. (see Gomez and Weiss (2013)). 
 
Finally, as we move to building systems in the mmW band, the propagation characteristics imply 
that, in practice, the rights bundle for spectrum use will be increasingly tied to real estate ownership 
of base station sites. Building a seamless, geographically diverse service will likely require 
spectrum and radio resource sharing to a degree that we have not seen before. For example, neutral 
host providers are expected to emerge in venues (e.g., stadiums, airports, shopping malls, 
campuses) that will provide spectrum facilities infrastructure (antennas, wired backhaul, power, 
and other non-spectrum network assets) in local areas that may be shared by multiple network 
operators (see Lehr (2017)). 
3.2.2. Small-cell Networks 
One of the trends in the last decade has been the rise of so-called small-cell networks. Splitting 
larger cells into multiple smaller (lower power) cells facilitates the spatial reuse of spectrum, 
thereby allowing spectrum resources to be utilized more intensively. Additionally, smaller cell 
architectures make it easier to make use of different spectrum assets since NLOS and distance-
propagation issues are less important. Finally, lower power provides benefits for mobile devices 
in terms of energy savings.  
 
When the cells become smaller, the spectrum used is a smaller fraction of the total cost of 
deploying an access point, and other factors loom larger in terms of determining the spectrum 
efficiency. For example, the spectral efficiency is very sensitive to the placement/orientation of 
base stations so operators deploying small cells will need to trade-off the increased cost savings 
realized from user-deployed small cells versus professional installation against the likely losses in 
spectral efficiency (see Chapin & Lehr (2011), Lehr & Oliver (2014)). 
 
In the context of 5G and the use of millimeter wave spectrum, small-cell networks naturally arise. 
It is clear that 5G networks would require an extensive spectrum sharing mechanism in every 
direction, as its objective is to support various degrees of requirements which include throughput, 
                                               
26 For a more detailed discussion, refer to https://www.rcrwireless.com/20160815/fundamentals/mmwave-
5g-tag31-tag99 
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quality of service, type and quality of devices, among others. Thus, it is expected that these 
networks should allow for seamless co-existence and collaboration of mobile and wireless systems, 
which according to researchers, will require collective efforts through open frameworks.27  
 
To achieve its small-cell and dynamic network objectives, 5G should exploit the limited 
interference stemming from the use of shorter wavelengths. Notable examples include providing 
opportunities for more efficient spectrum reuse and the possibility to address coverage issues with 
local, dynamically available licenses. 
3.2.3. Dynamic Spectrum Management Capabilities 
Different spectrum sharing arrangements raise different rights enforcement challenges. If spectrum 
is to be traded more dynamically via robust secondary markets,28 with spectrum users entering and 
leaving local markets on a more dynamic basis, better capabilities to track and enforce rights 
assignments will be needed. Frequently updated maps of transmission opportunities or white 
spaces will be needed to allow users to identify and assess the value of alternative rights bundles, 
and to contract for available spectrum resources. Big data analytic techniques, artificial 
intelligence, and softwarization29 methods are likely to be used to enhance current management 
techniques and develop novel ones. These methods may help us leverage existing historical 
information on spectrum use patterns in order to develop a more fine-grained, real-time 
optimization of spectrum co-existence options. This would permit spectrum users to identify 
spectrum allocation (or white space) opportunities on a more granular basis, expanding the range 
of secondary market activity that could be supported. 
 
New management systems such as the Spectrum Access System (SAS) that is being developed 
and deployed to manage the three-tiered spectrum sharing framework being adopted for the 
3.5GHz CBRS band should be capable of leveraging opportunities emerging from the 
aforementioned analysis techniques. This would also support efforts to forecast future spectrum 
access trends that may enhance upcoming sharing proposal schemes. 
                                               
27 For a more detailed discussion, refer to: http://theinstitute.ieee.org/ieee-roundup/blogs/blog/the-
softwarization-of-telecommunications-systems 
28 As we explain further below, secondary markets may exist across a range of time, location, and rights 
contexts. For example, there may be markets for long-term transfer of usage rights where buyers expect to 
retain the spectrum acquired for the long term, potentially until the end of the license term. There may also 
be real-time markets in which users acquire spectrum rights on a temporary basis with the rights reverting 
to the license holder who may be a band manager. There may be band-specific or geo-location specific 
secondary markets, or markets focused on specific classes of applications or wireless network services (that 
bundle spectrum as part of their market offering).  
29 Softwarization methods include Software Defined Networks, Network Function Virtualization and cloud 
computing. These methods promote to utilize software solutions instead of hardware improvements, which 
are expected to impact all stages of network development. For more information, please refer to: 
http://theinstitute.ieee.org/ieee-roundup/blogs/blog/the-softwarization-of-telecommunications-systems 
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4. Valuing Spectrum in a Shared Future 
Future spectrum use is likely to involve the use of "spectrum as a service" (see Doyle et al. (2014), 
Cramton & Doyle (2017)) and opportunities for the deployment of more robust secondary markets. 
Reinforcing the idea that the value of spectrum stems from the services provided with it, and with 
the help of technologies that enhance the flexible use of spectrum, we expect spectrum to be 
increasingly detached from specific and unique services. In turn, this gives place for the 
development of secondary spectrum markets where spectrum buyers can access spectrum 
resources that fit a wide variety of possible services. 
 
This still doesn’t solve the spectrum valuation problem. We have argued above that the $/MHz-
POP measure of valuation is becoming increasingly noisy for all but the highest-level purposes. 
This measure combines a metric addressing spectrum supply (MHz) and a metric addressing 
potential demand (POP). As we have argued above, the economic value of the supply part depends 
on many factors, such as system architecture, technology, frequency band, geography, etc. The 
demand part (POP) represents relatively homogenous users scattered over a sufficiently large 
geographic area (SMSA). In fact, systems support heterogeneous uses and users whose demand 
can vary substantially over relatively small geographic areas and by time of day/month/year.  
 
Thus, as we previously argued, we expect that valuation will be affected by a broad range of 
factors. Rather than simply criticize existing approaches, we must consider what attributes a more 
useful, less noisy valuation metric might have. To develop this, we consider factors predominantly 
related to demand separately from those predominantly related to supply. 
4.1. Demand-related factors 
We consider demand as user requirements for wireless information transfer. Users, here, are point 
sources that send and/or receive packets of digital information.30 The statistical characterization of 
the transmitted packets may be independent of the received packets. These point sources may be 
arranged geographically in many ways: associated with other infrastructures (e.g., roads, stadiums, 
airports), in other areas of economic production (e.g., sensors in factories). We expect "hot zones" 
of traffic to exist within an SMSA.  
 
One way of engineering a communication system is to dimension the system for a prescribed 
quality of service (e.g., dropped calls, blocked calls, packet delay, etc.). This kind of engineering 
process would seek to discover the location, timing, and intensity of the hot zones in an area and 
build a system to support them. This would lead to a potentially wide variation in system 
architecture and, hence, spectrum valuation within an SMSA.  
 
Note that not all wireless applications transmit packets. For example, broadcast systems have a 
single point source and many receivers through the service area. Likewise, sensor networks may 
transmit only and not receive. These transmissions are often considered to be at low levels of 
                                               
30 In discussing the demand for spectrum and characterizing it as involving the exchanging of packets, we 
do not mean to focus solely on two-way communication applications, but also include wireless sensing 
applications which may rely to differing degrees on the sending versus receipt of wireless signals (e.g., 
radio telescopes and radar applications). 
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transmission power, requiring a widely distributed infrastructure to receive and aggregate these 
signals. 
 
The traffic demand of the point sources is dependent on underlying social and economic activity, 
of course. We do not argue for including such a characterization in a valuation schema; but, it is 
also true that this complex context for wireless communications means that we should not assume 
that all transmissions are equally valuable.  
4.2. Supply-related factors 
As we have argued above, the mechanisms for providing wireless connectivity and capacity are 
substantially dependent on factors such as system architecture, the frequency band in use, 
governance of sharing arrangements, etc. When we can no longer assume "clean" radio bands, i.e., 
when radio bands are shared, the meaning of "MHz" as a capacity measure becomes ambiguous. 
It would certainly be possible to adjust the MHz measure by the average utilization, but it is quite 
conceivable (e.g., in mm-wave systems) that sharing is highly localized, so that adjustment may 
also be noisy.  
 
In a shared future, wireless capacity may be provided in a variety of ways. One of the leading 
approaches in the near term is using a database system to mediate sharing. This approach is in 
place for the TV White Spaces, and the CBRS proposes the use of a SAS as well. In particular, the 
SAS allows for two tiers of commercial sharing (Priority Access and General Access) with 
incumbent users. PAL license fees may provide a sense of the dynamics of valuation in shared 
spectrum since their durations are relatively short.  
 
Another approach considers a more generalized virtualization of spectrum and radio resources 
(Doyle et.al., 2014). These environments feature increasingly complex bundles of resources, and 
hence rights, that need to be assembled. Thus, we need a mechanism that can efficiently match 
supply and demand. Navigating the rights system can result in an onerous task that could signify 
an additional market entry barrier. A successful shared future requires mechanisms that can aid 
small and big participants to offer/obtain resources that fit the services of interest. One approach 
would be to develop auction mechanisms that best fit these market scenarios (probably at a high 
computational cost).  
 
Another approach could be to include a specialized entity (or ‘middleman’) that can serve this 
purpose. In Gomez M.M. (2017), the author explores the creation of such an entity, referred to as 
‘virtual network builder,’ whose duty is to match available spectrum supply with the market 
demand (stemming from service providers) in a secondary spectrum market. This network builder 
serves multiple purposes, a critical one being to leverage its knowledge of the market to assemble 
adequate bundles of resources for current and new market entrants. In this way, providers who 
have limited knowledge of the market can have similar opportunities as more experienced ones. 
In general terms, having an entity with knowledge of the market can increase the opportunities for 
resource suppliers and buyers alike, as we may be driving away from thin markets where a one-
to-one mapping of demand and supply is required. Additionally, having a source that can keep 
track of the fluctuations of prices paid for resources can serve to consistently analyze how the 
value of the spectrum resources changes and how that is influenced by the services provided by 
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the spectrum buyers. Of course, such a system would work if there is sufficient competition among 
middlemen.  
4.3. Toward alternative valuation measures 
As we move toward a world of more heterogeneous shared spectrum use (in terms of spectrum 
resources, users, uses, and networks), expanded valuation metrics will be needed to adjust more 
effectively for supply and demand differences.  
 
For example, as POP becomes a less useful proxy for anticipated demand, we may find a measure 
like Mbps/km2 to provide a more useful measure of demand, since it speaks to density of usage 
more directly. Such a measure would bundle in the data-layer communications capability of the 
network, and hence would further blur the boundaries between the spectrum resources used and 
the technology selected to enable the spectrum use. While some such measure may provide a better 
way to normalize for market demand, it would likely also pose challenges for how to control for 
differences across higher-layer network architectures and applications (e.g., are the Mbps traffic 
one-way or bi-directional, is the traffic real-time or cacheable).31 We suggest such a metric to 
highlight the need for the research and analyst community to think more expansively about 
potential valuation strategies and metrics. 
 
Typically, spatial variations are addressed by pixelating a geographic area. Pixelation itself has 
factors that need to be addressed (e.g., are pixels defined based on uniform area, uniform demand 
or uniform supply?) that are beyond the scope of this paper. A broad measure of value for a region 
(e.g. an SMSA) would require a sensible aggregation of the pixels in the area, a process that might 
better lend itself to a statistical description rather than a single number (e.g., average valuation, 
peak valuation). 
 
Focusing primarily on the economic value of licensed spectrum fails to capture the increased use 
of unlicensed spectrum, and the emergence of new models for spectrum access as underlays 
(UWB), overlays (TVWS), or new multi-tiered sharing models (CBRS) renders it increasingly 
inappropriate to price spectrum usage rights using a common $/MHz-POP price. From a social 
perspective, this approach leads to an unfair assessment of social value when comparing spectrum 
used by cellular provider networks to spectrum used by Wi-Fi networks. As noted earlier, cellular 
spectrum is mostly exclusively licensed, and its value is imputed via the revenues earned from the 
sale of cellular service. Imputing the value of Wi-Fi spectrum is more difficult because it is 
typically not monetized in service revenues. These problems can lead policymakers to false 
conclusions about the relative contributions to social value of exclusively licensed versus 
unlicensed spectrum.32  
 
                                               
31 For example, these are the sorts of distinctions that may matter if the traffic is entertainment video as 
opposed to video-conferencing. 
32 As we discuss further below, supporters of unlicensed have argued that this has biased policymaking 
toward preferring allocations to exclusively-licensed spectrum. Regardless of the position on takes on 
debates over whether additional spectrum should be unlicensed or licensed, the lack of comparable 
valuation metrics complicates decision-making and confuses the debate. 
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Moreover, the wide-spread practice of off-loading cellular traffic to Wi-Fi and the prospect of LTE 
use of unlicensed spectrum demonstrates that from an end-user and service provider perspective, 
spectrum is increasingly being regarded as substitutable. However, the relative scarcity of 
exclusive-use spectrum and its value in enabling network operators exert stronger control over the 
quality of service that can be provided via the spectrum, may tend to increase the private value of 
licensed spectrum. At the same time, the average value of a bundle of spectrum resources (high 
and low frequency, licensed and unlicensed) may either go up or down depending on aggregate 
supply and demand conditions.   
4.4. Secondary markets and spectrum valuation 
The same trends that are driving increased demand toward more dynamic access to heterogenous 
spectrum resources are making it increasingly important that we evolve efficient secondary 
markets for transacting spectrum.  
 
This is due, in large part, because it is generally acknowledged that the only way we can meet the 
growing demand for spectrum usage rights to support all of the different wireless networks, 
technologies, and end-users that want such rights is by sharing spectrum more intensively among 
heterogeneous users, uses, and networks. Increasingly, the technology and market ecosystem are 
emerging to render spectrum with heterogeneous quality (in terms of its RF characteristics, 
regulatory license-terms, and business usage cases/models) increasingly substitutable and 
complementary.33 This increases the social cost of failing to reallocate spectrum on a more 
dynamic basis to its most efficient uses. As discussed earlier, while auctions are appropriately 
viewed as important tools for enabling markets to play a larger role in spectrum management, and 
when appropriately designed, can help ensure that spectrum is directed to the licensees with the 
highest private usage values (which also ought to correspond to the highest social usage values if 
downstream markets are also efficient), this assignment only applies as long as the market 
valuations at the time of the auction apply. Over time, changes in markets and technology will 
cause valuations to alter, opening the potential that auction assignments are no longer optimal. It 
is in such situations that secondary markets will become increasingly important.  
 
At this point, it is unclear precisely how or which secondary markets will evolve to be of greatest 
importance. In an idealized vision of perfect secondary markets, spectrum buyers and sellers could 
come together and buy and sell spectrum rights in liquid, efficient markets, akin to those that exist 
to trade commodities like oil, hog bellies, or silver. To the extent this occurs, we expect bundles 
of spectrum rights to transact more like commodity goods or widgets, although the pricing may 
vary significantly by local context (measured in time duration of access rights, precise location, 
and other attributes). The epitome of such a model was captured by the academics and 
                                               
33 Having heterogeneous spectrum assets and networks that are increasingly spectrum agile allows operators 
greater flexibility in mix-and-matching spectrum resources to the needs of specific situations. This allows 
operators to exploit the relative differences in spectrum usefulness when that is desirable (complementary) 
or to offset those differences when the spectrum resources need to act as substitutes. Thus spectrum is never 
purely capacity or coverage spectrum, but can be either or both, as needed.  
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policymakers that investigated models for spectrum sharing based on Spectrum Usage Rights 
(SUR).34  
 
Many of the participants in such markets are actually producers or buyers of the commodities, but 
there are also market speculators and intermediaries. There are also financial derivatives (futures, 
options, and more complicated securities) that are based on commodity markets. Collectively, 
these give rise to a complex matrix of market price data associated with the various transactions. 
Were such markets to exist in spectrum, we would have lots of spectrum valuation data, and users 
of spectrum would just need to look to the market prices to infer the market value for spectrum.  
 
While highly liquid markets already exist for real commodities and their financial derivatives for 
many goods and services, secondary spectrum markets are very far from that ideal and they are 
unlikely to get there any time in the foreseeable future due to the inherent limitations in spectrum 
commodification identified earlier.35 Nevertheless, enabling expanding options for secondary 
market spectrum trading is important to facilitate the transition to more efficient spectrum 
management regimes and greater sharing among heterogeneous network operators. With better 
secondary markets, market forces could be used to re-partition or assemble rights bundles that 
more closely match market conditions.  
 
The promotion of secondary markets and the focus on spectrum valuation metrics are linked 
because a challenge in getting to liquid secondary markets is the lack of potential buyers and sellers 
of rights, which in turn, is due in part to the lack of a consensus on how spectrum should be valued. 
Better publicly available information on spectrum prices (which more active secondary market 
transaction data would provide) would contribute to a greater consensus on how to value spectrum 
and would promote greater trust on secondary markets. Would-be buyers and sellers are more 
inclined to rely on secondary markets for off-loading excess spectrum resources or for acquiring 
additional resources if they can be confident that the markets are fair and competitive (i.e., free 
from hold-up risks). As secondary markets evolve and become more liquid (on both the demand 
and the supply side), they will provide a stream of useful spectrum pricing data that will contribute 
to reinforcing the liquidity and efficiency of those markets. In this sense, better valuation and 
pricing data will contribute to the development of secondary spectrum markets and the 
development of those markets will enhance collective spectrum valuation capabilities.  
                                               
34 In 2006, the UK regulator, Ofcom, launched a consultation to define Spectrum User Rights (SURs) that 
could provide the basis for a regulatory-implemented, technically-neutral property rights regime that would 
allow rights holders to trade interference-protected spectrum rights (see Ofcom (2006), "Spectrum Usage 
Rights: Final Report," UK Ofcom, 1721/TNR/ES/1, February 10, 2006, available at 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-and-statements/category-1/sur). For further discussions of what 
might be possible in the way of technical approaches to defining spectrum rights bundles, see Matheson, 
Robert, and Adele C. Morris. "The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market 
efficiency." Telecommunications Policy 36.9 (2012): 783-792 or Doyle, L., Kibiłda, J., Forde, T.K. and 
DaSilva, L., 2014. Spectrum without bounds, networks without borders. Proceedings of the IEEE, 102(3), 
pp.351-365.  
35 Mayo and Wallsten (2010) documented the role of nascent spectrum secondary markets for spectrum. 
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5. Conclusions and Future Research Directions 
Spectrum derives its value from how it is used. Appropriate metrics to value spectrum resources 
are needed to allow wireless users, network providers and policymakers to make informed 
decisions about how best to allocate spectrum usage rights and direct investment in wireless 
infrastructure and services.  
 
Historically, opportunities to trade and transfer spectrum usage rights were limited by technology, 
markets, and regulatory policies. With changing technology and market conditions, barriers to 
reallocating and transferring spectrum rights has impeded efforts to ensure scarce spectrum 
resources are directed to their highest value uses. Although policymakers have made significant 
progress toward transitioning from legacy C&C style spectrum management toward market-based 
spectrum management, further progress is needed. The emergence of robust secondary markets 
would help address this issue, but an impediment to their emergence is the lack of good data on 
the value of spectrum that would allow wireless users to assess the relative value of spectrum and 
facilitate the pricing of trades in spectrum resources.  
 
Historically, the most commonly used metric for comparing the value of spectrum has been the 
$/MHz-POP metric, which has been used to summarize data from auctions and secondary market 
transactions, principally associated with mobile broadband licenses. In this paper, we have argued 
that this popular metric of spectrum value has become less useful over time as technology, services 
and spectrum allocation and assignment approaches have changed. 
 
With increased reliance on shared spectrum and business models based on mixing licensed and 
unlicensed spectrum, the $/MHz-POP data based on transactions for exclusively-licensed 
spectrum will prove less useful for valuing more complicated spectrum rights bundles. The 
emergence of IoT, 5G, millimeter wave technology and smarter networks and devices are 
increasing both the demand for and the capabilities of wireless networks to utilize spectrum on a 
more granular and dynamic basis. The intensifying demand for spectrum usage rights is for all 
types of uses from all types of users. This includes increased demand for communications and 
sensing applications, commercial and government users, and legacy and new networks. These 
capabilities and shifting demand priorities are increasing the need for secondary markets to effect 
the requisite rights transfers, but the emergence of such markets are hampered by the lack of 
appropriate valuation metrics.  
 
As shared spectrum becomes a dominant feature of spectrum assignment and use in the future, we 
expect that spectrum resources will become increasingly detached from specific services and users, 
enabling heterogeneous users and uses to share spectrum more intensively. As services become 
more flexible, bundles of rights may become more complex, further complicating the challenge of 
assessing the value of the underlying spectrum resources. In consequence, we expect there to be 
multiple spectrum valuation metrics, but consensus on a limited set of valuation methods will help 
support more robust spectrum secondary markets. 
 
Although market and technology trends are making spectrum more commodity-like, allowing 
increased substitution of spectrum resources in different frequency bands, there are inherent limits 
to spectrum substitutability that will persist even in the long term. Nearer term, and during the on-
going transition toward increased reliance on market forces, spectrum substitutability will be 
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further limited by the need to accommodate diverse wireless architectures with heterogeneous 
spectrum requirements (e.g., legacy v. new radios, lower v. higher frequency, local v. large 
coverage area, macro-cell v. small cell, etc.),  usage models (e.g., commercial v. government, low 
v. high bit rate, communications v. sensing, etc.) and regulatory regimes (e.g., exclusive v. shared,  
on-demand v. long-term-licensed, cooperative v. non-cooperative sharing, etc.). Identifying the 
right bundle of spectrum resources will remain highly context dependent (e.g., dependent on the 
users’ business model, local market and technology context, and RF environment), necessitating 
adjusting spectrum values for multiple factors. We have identified many of these factors and 
discussed qualitatively how emerging supply and demand trends are affecting spectrum valuation 
and opportunities for substitution.  
 
While we feel confident in concluding that the overall challenge for valuing spectrum is getting 
more complex but also more important, we do not feel confident in predicting whether average 
spectrum prices or the variance in value by location, time of day, or level of interference protection 
will increase or decrease. On one hand, the increased spectrum agility of emerging wireless 
networks is expanding the supply of spectrum on the intrinsic (e.g., by allowing more dynamic 
and finer-grained allocation to support higher levels of simultaneous spectrum utilization by 
diverse users and uses) and extrinsic (e.g., by opening new higher frequency resources in the 
millimeter wave bands to commercial use) margins. On the other hand, demand for wireless access 
from all sorts of users and networks continues to grow rapidly.  
 
Going forward, we need more empirical research across the entire frequency domain on how 
shifting spectrum usage models are impacting the costs of wireless networking, demand for 
wireless services, and value creation associated with using our scarce spectrum resources. We also 
need further work on designing institutional frameworks, contracting mechanisms, and 
enforcement models for supporting the development of robust, competitive secondary markets to 
allow market forces greater scope to reallocate spectrum resources efficiently. This may include 
developing standardized contracts for spectrum resource bundles. Moreover, collecting and 
publishing data on rights assignments and transaction pricing, much of which may be generated 
by robust secondary markets will be important and will help promote the development of such 
markets.  
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